

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000300020018-3

IAC-D-57/42

20 July 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 63-56:

Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam

Through Mid-1957,

dated 17 July 1956

I. Findings

We have encountered a number of intelligence gaps in the preparation of this estimate which limit our ability to deal confidently with a number of important questions:

a. Military intelligence coverage of North Vietnam has deteriorated markedly during the past year; this deterioration began with the withdrawal of French military forces from North Vietnam in May 1955, and was hastened by the rapid withdrawal of French personnel from the South and the final dissolution of the French Military Command. Timely Order of Battle information on the Viet Minh forces is almost totally lacking and information on training and logistic activities is poor.

b. Coverage of Viet Minh paramilitary forces in South Vietnam also is unsatisfactory. The quality of the information available is such that our possible margin of error on the strength of these forces exceeds 50 percent.

c. We lack detailed information on the scope, tactics, logistical aspects, and effectiveness of Vietnamese Army operations against the sect forces. Our estimate of the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Army is therefore subject to considerable errors.

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000300020018-3

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

IAC-D-57/42
20 July 1956

d. Accurate information on production and trade in North Vietnam is lacking. Information on the availability of food would indicate the prevalence of mass starvation; yet we have no evidence that large numbers of deaths have occurred.

II. Action

It is requested that appropriate action be taken by the agencies concerned, particularly with respect to DRV troop movements and dispositions.

SECRET